

00541

1962/10/20

2136

31-111 (72)
D
BIAS
BS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
() RELEASE
() EXCISE
() DENY
() DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

TS authority to:
() S or () C OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

Time

0-48 hours
or earlier

Political Action

Military Action

Responsibility

1. Letter to CDR TS in law
delivered by Brazilian
Ambassador in Havana

2. Statement to Doherty that
intolerable build ups containing
and that these involved in Cuba
may suffer.

3. OAS request US act as agent
for OAS to continue surveillance
and help OAS evaluate threat.

4. White House statement that offensive
build up containing dangerous and
provocative act which increases gravity
of situation. State instruct embassies
to follow up.

5. Advise CINCPAC concerning
possible alternative US actions,
likely timing, results expected
and schedule of notifications
and consultations with NATO
Governments; ask for recommendations
about US action on intelligence
into readiness.

6. Consult with (1.E., advise concerning
latest intelligence, range of possible US
actions, and results expected) the following:
a. UK, France, FRC
b. Canada

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED, OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MR Cases Only:

Date:

12-18-92

(X) RELEASE
() EXCISE
() DENY
() DELETE Non-Responsive Info
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

IS/FPC/CDR
EO Citations
TS authority to
() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY Moskowitz DATE 2/10/08
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () Non-Responsive Info
FOIA, EO or PA Exemptions (b)(1), (b)(5)
TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

8-12

16. Inform Washington Ambassadorial Group

State

17. Continuing absence of any evidence that major actions being taken on dismantling of missiles and bombers.

8-3

19. Dispatch cable guidance to US Embassies and USIA posts in Europe.

18. Presidential order to White House strike.

8-6

20. Notification of Turkish and Italian Prime Ministers that Soviets might attempt some counter-action with regard to Jupiters and to remain calm.

State

21. SACRIR asks NATO governments for authority to place forces on slot at 8-hour

22. Inform of nature of operation:

State

a. All other NATO governments
b. MAC

23. Air strike against all known HRRM and IRM sites followed immediately by low level strikes have follow-up strike in air ready for release.

DOD

24. Notify Dobrynin of attack

State

25. Notify Ambassadorial representative at UN

State

26. Briefing of Latin Ambassadors

State

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET, ONDR

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5-hour

27. Briefing of UNO Ambassadors

State

28. Call for Security Council Meeting
first afternoon

State

29. Briefing of Congressional Leadership

White House,
State, DOD

5 of 1

30. Brief, public announcement of fact
of attack and preliminary results.

White House

5 of 4

31. Inform Standing Group, Military Committee
and UK, French and FRG Ambassadors of details
of results.

State, DOD

32. Inform Congressional Leadership of details
of results

State, DOD

33. Presidential announcement of attack and
results

White House

34. Leaflet drop in Cuba
stressing fact that attack
limited to Soviet bases;
weakness of Soviet strength
in Cuba.

DOD

35. Briefing in friendly capitals in
Western Europe

State

36. Briefing for CENTO

State

37. Continue military preparations
measures to include deployment
recommended by SACEM and agreed
by the United States.

DOD

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3 of 14

38. Meeting of OAS followed by Organ
of Consultation Meeting

State

39. Meeting of Security Council at
which US representative would pursuant
to Article 34 of the Charter inform the
Security Council of the action taken.

State

SECRET, UN UN

SECRET, OADR

ADVANTAGES OF THIS COURSE

1. Carries out President's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to US and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of US momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that US has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-a-vis Berlin).
2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council.
3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.
4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.
5. Signals clearly that US not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, NATO and elsewhere.
6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and Cuban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in world.
7. Removes a military threat to US from Cuban territory.
8. Denies Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.
9. Pressure preceding strike may be sufficient to accomplish objective without execution of attack - especially if a suitable cut available to Khrushchev and Castro.

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TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~, ORDER
~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

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1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.

2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.

3. Adverse effect on US image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused solely on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.

4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range US-Cuban relations.

5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.

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